|
Battle Strategy and Tactics
The Mitannian Campaigns
Temple scenes and inscriptions as well as autobiographical inscriptions in tombs of serving soldiers provide details of campaigns and battle tactics. Temple inscriptions record the expeditions of Tuthmosis I and Tuthmosis III in Syria/Palestine and describe their actions to control the expansion of the Mitannians in that area. On his first campaign Tuthmosis III defeated a coalition of Syrian princes at the fortified town of Megiddo; this victory was the basis of his future expansion in Syria/Palestine. In all he led seventeen campaigns in Syria to drive the Mitannians back across the Euphrates and establish his power there. A key policy in his assault on the Syrian hinterland was the preliminary subjugation and provisioning of harbors along the Syria/Palestine coast to support and supply his troops. For the crossing of the Euphrates in his eighth campaign (year 33), boats were built in the coastal port of Byblos and then transported overland on ox drawn wagons. Ramesses II at Kadesh There is a detailed account (in several versions) of Ramesses II’s tactics at Kadesh in year 5 of his reign. He led his army across the Egyptian frontier at Sile and then marched for a month to reach the height overlooking the city of Kadesh some fifteen miles away. His army was split up into four divisions and named after gods Amun, Pre, Sutekh, and Ptah. The army waited, ready to attack, and early the next morning Ramesses led the Amun division forward to surprise Kadesh. Two Bedouin who said they had deserted the service of the Hittite king gave Ramesses false information that the Hittites were far away in the land of Khaleb. Ramesses and his bodyguard therefore marched ahead of the rest of the army and set up camp about six miles from the ford northwest of Kadesh. Several miles behind was the division of Pre, followed by the division of Ptah, with the division of Sutekh bringing up the rear. The king, with only his bodyguard at hand, should have waited for these troops to reach him, but he soon realized that the Bedouin had lied to him and that the enemy was actually near at hand hidden to the east of Kadesh. They now advanced on Ramesses, cutting through the division of Pre, and the king quickly sent his vizier to bring forward the division of Ptah. The Egyptian account claims that Ramesses, single-handed and surrounded by Hittite troops, now exercised his own skill and enterprise to throw them into the river Orontes. The text of one of the Egyptian inscriptions that relates these events (known as the “Report”) and the accompanying scenes on the temple walls suggests however that it was the young troops who arrived just in time from the land of Amor who saved the Egyptian position by attacking the Hittites from the rear. Ramesses probably did display great valor (the Hittite ruler even sent him a letter praising his bravery), but the Egyptian accounts generally give a one-sided and probably not entirely accurate version of events. Records found at Bogazköy (the Hittite capital) inscribed on clay tablets imply that the Egyptians returned home after a strategic defeat. There is probably some truth and exaggeration in both accounts since Ramesses did have further military successes in Hittite territory after the Kadesh encounter. .
.
Style of Warfare
In general, however, the Egyptians did not really develop any true art of warfare. When enemies such as the Syrians, Hittites, and Libyans took refuge within fortified towns and areas, the Egyptian policy was to starve them into submission and then to enter the stronghold by using ladders and breaking down the gates. As early as the Old Kingdom the scaling ladder was already in use, and by the Middle Kingdom they employed the battering ram and protected themselves against the enemy’s projectiles by means of a type of hut. They do not seem to have had siege engines, however, and never developed war techniques to the same standard as the Assyrians. In open territory soldiers engaged in handto- hand combat. The fallen enemy were numbered in a count and offered up to the king: Their heads, hands, or penises were cut off and piled up to be presented to the royal herald. Generally, the battle convention was that the Egyptians suggested a specific day for battle, and if the enemy was not ready the encounter was postponed. Their enemies did not always observe these rules, however, and sometimes launched surprise attacks as in Ramesses II’s encounter with the Hittites at Kadesh. Fighting was obviously severe on many occasions, and soldiers sustained dreadful wounds. One example is provided by the mummy of Seqenenre Ta’o II the Theban ruler who played a major role in expelling the Hyksos from Egypt. Evidence of an axe wound is clearly visible in his skull. Also, in a tomb near the funerary monument of King Mentuhotep Nebhepetre at Deir el-Bahri the badly mutilated bodies of sixty Egyptian soldiers have been discovered. Nearly all have severe wounds on the top of their skulls, and it is likely that they perished while attacking a fortress or town. The king probably acknowledged their contribution to his victory by having them buried near his own tomb. An important aspect of training recruits was their participation in competitions and contests watched by the king and his nobles. Scenes in mastaba tombs show young men engaged in javelin throwing and wrestling contests, and in a tomb at Beni Hasan there is a continuous series of scenes showing two wrestlers. They are engaged in actions and movements that according to modern experts closely follow the current rules of this sport. .
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Battle Strategy and Tactics
|
||||
